Friday, September 03, 2010

The Password is Dead, Long Live the Password

This article from Information Week relates the ease by which a Graphics Processing Unit on a readily available graphics card renders 7 character passwords useless because they are too easily guessed.
So is the Password dead?  Beyond dead, a pile of bones picked clean?

To answer that, you have to think of the threat in the larger context. That's true of any security  arm-waving you encounter.

Consider other attack vectors sharing the same outcome (credential theft) or the same ultimate goal.

Then, think about the various security controls that address the steps in each of these attack vectors.

Only with this sort of methodical, thorough analysis can you get a good handle on the issue. For example...

Consider that the attack described in the article, a brute force password guessing attack, where the ciphertext / hash of a password is known ahead of time, is just one vector for password compromise.

Provided that the attacker cannot get the ciphertext in the first place (the /etc/shadow or the NTLM hash or what have you), then this kind of offline password guessing is rendered useless, itself.

So don't let the bad guys get your encrypted passwords.

Your controls (flaw remediation/patching, access control enforcement, and so forth) should reduce the likelihood of this significantly.

Another attack vector is that of brute force guessing against a logon interface. This attack can be hampered by logon failure delays that slow down the process and by account lockouts where several failed logons within a particular time window lock the account.

A way around these controls is to guess one password, each, for a long list of accounts. This delays the time between guesses for any one account.  Even if you exceed threshold of failed logons on that account, it happens outside the time window.

Logging combined with solid monitoring will, hopefully, notify someone of repeated logon failures. The logging part is easy. The monitoring can be harder, requiring some combination of technical and people/process solution (think SOC / incident response / CIRT).

Using a keylogger delivered through malware is probably a much easier way to steal credentials. A host of controls have to be in place to protect users from themselves, and protect operating systems from infection by such stuff.

So should we protect ourselves from GPU-based password cracking?  The problem is that the solutions are expensive or onerous.  Complex 12-character passwords are going to wreak havoc amongst the user community and use of smart cards or tokens or whatever, are going to cost a fortune.

Is this the best place to spend scant security dollars?  Or should you spend your infosec budget on a stone that takes out two birds?

That is, controls that not only protect password hashes but the other sensitive data on your servers and networks?  You need to do that anyway.

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